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Business and Delays in Port Reform in Brazil
MAHRUKH DOCTOR*
The case of port modernization reform in Brazil encapsules the problems Brazil-
ian reformers face. Although reform legislation was passed in 1993 (Law 8.630/93),
many obstacles remain for full implementation of its provision. This article focuses
on how business attitudes and actions deferred reform, and demonstrates how busi-
ness is unable to contribute to reform implementation because of institutional obstacles
and collective action problems. It then suggests a mechanism to overcoming these
difficulties; specifically, it examines the evolution of corporatism and the value of
constructing democratic close-knit policy communities meeting the needs of each sector.
The empirical work is complemented with an unusual combination of three theoreti-
cal approaches to explain the political economy of institutional modernization: in-
stitutional economics as developed by Douglas North, the logic of collective action
as elaborated by Mancur Olson, and policy network analysis as developed by Marsh
and Rhodes, Jordan and Richardson.
I. INTRODUCTION
This article analyses the case of port modernization reform in Brazil and ex-
plains why business action and influence varies at different stages of the reform
process. Specifically, it accounts for business’ exceptional role in policy formulation,
but subsequent weak performance in contributing to and monitoring reform imple-
mentation. The case is particularly interesting because it encapsules the problems
Brazilian reformers face elsewhere in the economic and political liberalization pro-
cess and throws light on the incrementalist approach to reform, typical in Brazil. It
also demonstrates how in the context of the dismantling of the developmentalist
State and the achievement of economic stabilization, corporatist institutions ham-
per business articulation, interest representation and profits.
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This article focuses on how business attitudes and actions deferred reform, but
it is based on a wider and extensive study of the formulation, adoption and imple-
mentation of the Port Modernization Law (Law 8.630/93). It shows how business
is unable to sustain pressure to ensure reform implementation because of institu-
tional obstacles and collective action problems, and then suggests possible approaches
to overcoming these difficulties. It explores the options open to Brazil with respect
to adapting corporatist institutions to a democratic and increasingly open market
economy. Specifically, it examines the evolution of corporatism and the value of
developing a new associational landscape, with the construction of both close-knit
policy communities meeting the needs of each sector and a broader peak associa-
tion representing cross-sectoral business interests. Institutional constraints suggest
a progressive pluralization of corporatism, with increasing democratization of so-
cietal input into policy-making, rather than a complete abandonment of the corpo-
ratist institutional structure instituted by president Vargas in the 1930s and 1940s.
There appears to be positive potential for the gradual evolution of corporatism.
Conversely, success would be less likely should policy-makers decide to introduce
systemic change via a comprehensive overhaul of economic regimes and rules of the
game.
The article has five sections: (i) introduction to the analytical framework; (ii)
brief comments on the situation in Brazilian ports and the impact of business lob-
bying; (iii) how corporatist sectoralization and business disunity obstruct reform
implementation; (iv) mechanisms for overcoming business difficulties, specifically,
the creation of policy networks to build sectoral strength; and (v) some concluding
remarks.
The theoretical and empirical analysis appears side-by-side throughout the
article, which applies an unusual combination of three theoretical approaches that
surprisingly complement each other: institutional economics as developed by Dou-
glas North, the logic of collective action as elaborated by Mancur Olson, and policy
network analysis as developed by Marsh and Rhodes, Jordan and Richardson.1 This
combination enriches the analysis and is justified, given that any single approach
cannot adequately explain the outcomes of the Brazilian political economy.
Institutional analysis focuses on the impact of institutions on policy design and
outcomes; in other words, institutions may or may not be supportive of reform.
North’s analysis incorporates the traditional political science view of institutions as
formal rules and informal constraints on economic and political actors, but goes
beyond this to claim that institutions (and not just societal actors or organizations)
can have goals.2 Institutions provide stability, but must include mechanisms to al-
low society to explore alternatives to solving new problems and to respond to new
issues. “It is essential to have rules that eliminate not only failed economic organi-
1 See bibliography for full references of these authors’ works.
2 North’s (1990) view is that the main goal of institutions is to reduce transaction costs, by reducing
uncertainty, increasing available information and guaranteeing property rights.
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zations, but failed political organizations as well [...] that the institutional structure
not only rewards successes, but also vetoes the survival of maladapted parts of the
organizational structure, [...]”3 However, inefficient institutions survive by relying
on entrenched interests that oppose reform. In particular, this article demonstrates
how corporatist institutions influence the representation of interests in Brazil and
shape the expectations and behavior of all political and economic actors including
labor, business, government, legislators, bureaucrats and the media. However, in-
stitutional analysis alone is insufficient to explain how groups organize to replace
and modernize institutions.
The logic of collective action model focuses on the rationale behind the orga-
nization of groups, and how this determines their power and impact on the policy
process. The simple Olsonian argument is that the effectiveness of a group is not a
function of its degree of support in society, but rather depends on its ability to or-
ganize itself to attain a collective good. Broadly speaking, the business community
as a whole, or any large section thereof (for example, exporters), is not a small privi-
leged group, and therefore faces the collective action problems typical of any large
group (Olson, 1965). The logic of collective action leads to the expectation that
interests remain latent unless a so-called political entrepreneur succeeds in making
co-operation rational and minimizes the problem of free-riders. Given the dynam-
ics and difficulties of group organization, normally organizing small groups based
on “special interests” is much easier. Another crucial point in the model is that
“widespread and enthusiastic agreement on a political goal may give rise to no
contribution at all” (Moe, 1980), because nobody has a disproportionate gain from
or a special interest in organizing for it. However, the model focuses on the forma-
tion of groups, but not on their survival and influence over policy. It underplays the
impact of the State on organizing interests, and the role of institutions in the trans-
lation of policy preferences into policy outcomes.
The policy network approach emphasizes the importance of developing on-going
close links between business and State actors in a democratic context to maximize
the match between policy intentions and outcomes. Policy network analysis repre-
sents a new approach to business-State relations in Brazil, notwithstanding hints in
the literature referring to iron triangles and bureaucratic rings. The approach, pre-
dominantly developed in Britain to study interest group intermediation, emphasizes
the importance of the continuity of relations between interest groups and govern-
ment departments, in an essentially pluralist context. It focuses on the meso-level
of policy-making, usually looking into the relationship that develops between po-
litical institutions and interest groups. The article compares the nature of the dif-
ferent types of networks operating in the Brazilian port sector, and demonstrates
how old style corporatist networks (including bureaucratic rings) differ from mod-
ern policy networks. One of the approach’s weaknesses is that it fails to consider
the difficulty of forming and maintaining a policy community in times of policy
3 North (1990), p. 81, italics are my words.
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change. All the same, it suggests a useful means of analyzing the possible evolution
of corporatism in Brazil.
In terms of methodology, the research project was based on written question-
naires and over seventy open-ended interviews (lasting between one and three hours)
with most of the major participants in the process, including business and labor
leaders, policy-makers in the legislature and executive, port administrators, a labor
court judge, and senior journalists (the media played a key role).
A final comment before analyzing the specific case of port modernization in
Brazil: in developing countries, bureaucratic control over distribution of subsidies
gives industrialists every incentive to focus on individual interests and free ride rather
than investing effort in developing a collective agenda. In this context, it becomes
necessary to develop institutions that minimize the conflict between social and in-
dividual interests. Initially, corporatism fulfilled this purpose, but by the mid 1980s,
democratization, globalization and liberalization exposed the urgent need to over-
haul corporatism. However, institutional modernization is difficult when opposi-
tion originates in vested interests, where a secure, closed and established network
between officials and private interests exist. In such cases, reform and economic
transformation is often delayed, if not aborted.
II. BUSINESS AS SPUR TO PORT REFORM LEGISLATION
By 1990, inefficient infrastructure, inadequate institutional arrangements re-
garding port labor, administration and operation, and neglected investment needs
lay at the heart of the high cost and low productivity of Brazilian ports. Although
a number of factors influenced the formulation and approval of the Port Modern-
ization Law, Law 8.630/93 in February 1993, the contribution of business lobbying
stands out as the central factor, indispensable to the successful formulation of the
policy. Ação Empresarial Integrada (AEI), as the business lobby was known, was
unique in Brazilian history, because it was the first time business formally organized
a unified lobbying network to achieve a specific policy change via democratic means.
Until the late 1980s, in line with Olsonian predictions of group behavior, port-
users, a dispersed group with few strong motivations for collective action, remained
a latent interest group.4 Business assets were more flexible and seldom tied to one
area of activity. An effective port reform lobby was organized only after the impact
of globalization, an end to ISI and the opening of the economy forced industry to
focus on competitiveness. Again in line with Olsonian predictions, the few large in-
dustrialists with a vital stake in reducing port costs, or expecting a disproportionate
gain, took the initiative in organizing the port reform lobby (this included steel ex-
porters, like Jorge Gerdau, and private terminal owners). The importance of a critical
4 This argument is reinforced by the fact that capitalists in general find it very difficult to co-operate
since their principal relationship to each other is governed by competition.
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mass of individuals willing to bear the initial costs of organizing collective action was
crucial. This active group of “winners” could then overcome the apathy of the rest.
AEI’s lobbying success may lie in its unusual structure — a peak association (which
increased the representativeness of its position) that operated like a network (which
increased the flexibility of its action). At its height, it included 52 business associa-
tions and federations.5 In addition to representatives from the major exporting in-
dustries and large private terminal owners, entrepreneurs eager to exploit the market’s
demand for importing capital and consumer goods also gave low-key support. AEI’s
inner core of six or seven businessmen operated like a strategic nucleus and under-
took all negotiations and lobbying on behalf of business. Moreover, it was willing to
test new approaches to lobbying, based on building a network of pro-reform actors
within the State. AEI convinced policy-makers in the executive and legislature of the
importance of port reform and successfully presented its case to the media and the
public. Most remarkably, it managed to convince labor peak associations that reform
was necessary and therefore to withhold their explicit support from port unions.
Table I
Sectoral Origin of AEI Members (May 1992)
Confederations and Federations (industry & commerce) 10
Mining, Steel & Other Metals 9
Machines, Equipment & Transport Materials 6
Chemicals, Textiles, Paper & Others 9
Food & Agriculture 9
Shipping & Port-Related 5
Exports 2
Source: AEI, 1992
Business also avoided blaming the government directly for the situation in ports
and focused its efforts on three demands:
1. End of the labour union monopoly;
2. Liberty of the private terminals to handle third party cargoes; and
3. Privatization of port services and restructuring of ports in the near-term.
A key AEI member (interview July 1994) emphasized the importance of the
broad consensus among business, and provided useful insight when he acknowl-
edged that:
“Businessmen at best had a general idea of the inefficiencies of the
Brazilian port system. They also knew that change would be beneficial,
but were unsure about what exactly would serve their best interest. This
is the big secret of our unity. We appeared monolithic; we acted unified
5 Although the federations did not actively participate in lobbying Congress, they lent their support to
AEI and allowed it to speak in the name of most business. This allowed AEI to rely on the moral sup-
port of the official corporatist associations, augmenting its legitimacy in the eyes of legislators and society.
84
because the majority of businessmen did not understand the system. They
left port reform in our hands to do as we thought best.”
Interviews revealed numerous positive evaluations of business unity and lob-
bying performance. Port union leaders unanimously praised AEI’s organizational
effort. Here is one example:6
“It is the most competent lobby ever seen in the country. Business made
excellent use of the media, maintained a constant presence in Congress,
employed competent staff and pursued a rigorous follow-up on all points.”
Business consensus was most remarkable given the typical businessman’s atti-
tude that is self-regarding, short-term and competitive vis-à-vis other businessmen.
Business interviewees repeatedly stated that business refused to give up in the face of
unmotivated governments, lethargic bureaucracies and insular labour unions. Although
lack of general business understanding and commitment to the finer points of the
reform was not a problem during policy formulation (indeed some claimed it was an
advantage), it would hamper pro-reform actors in the implementation process. As
one business interviewee (October 1997) commented, “maintaining solidarity is very
difficult, when business commitment dissolves with the first threat of a strike.”
Table II
Evaluation of Lobbying Success of Business and Labor Groups
Option Business (port users) Labor (port unions)
Very Successful 18% 4%
Successful 62% 29%
Little Success 20% 58%
Unsuccessful 0 9%
Source: responses to author’s written questionnaire. 45 respondees included business, labor, port administrators
and federal legislators.
Finally, in the context of democratization and liberalization, AEI demonstrated
that business understood the need for a re-evaluation of past business strategies and
a new approach to business-State relations, based on more open interaction and
reduced State intervention.
Table III
Average of Tons Loaded Per Man/Hour (1990)
Kobe 184
New Orleans 120
Rotterdam 70
Hamburg 60
Santos and Rio 30
Source: Jornal do Brasil, 1991
6 Interview in Santos in May 1994.
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Table IV
Loading of Non-Plane Steel Products (1989)
Port Average Cost (US$/Ton) Size of Work Team (land + ship)
Antwerp 4.50 24 + 18 = 42
Hamburg 5.90 21 + 15 = 36
Rotterdam 7.20 18 + 12 = 30
New Orleans 10.00 24 + 15 = 39
Vitória 12 - 15
Rio de Janeiro 18 - 23 28 + 45 = 73
Santos 35 - 37
Source: ASP, 1989
In addition to strong, unified and effective business lobbying, another four key
factors acted as spurs to reform: (i) the effect of globalization, trade liberalization
and systemic competitiveness (Custo Brasil) on the Brazilian economy; (ii) the im-
pact of the disastrous situation in Brazilian ports on the efficiency of cargo handling;
(iii) the experience of other country’s with port reform, especially port labor regime
reform; and (iv) strong media interest which increased public awareness of the causes
for the inefficiency of Brazilian ports. Ports were plagued by crumbling equipment
and infrastructure, out-dated technology, the government’s arbitrary and precari-
ous system of taxation, entangled port bureaucracy, inefficient customs procedures,
as well as an unproductive labor regime. However, most businessmen admitted that
before the liberalization of the economy, end of numerous subsidies, downturn in
the domestic market and noticeable impact of globalisation, businesses had paid little
attention to high port costs.
Table V
Principal Problems in Brazilian Ports (pre-1993)
Port union monopoly* 67%
Inadequate management authority 47%
Low productivity of port labor 40%
Organizational density 40%
Lack of capital-intensive cargo-handling systems 31%
Poor maintenance of port equipment 29%
Customs procedures 22%
Overlapping rules 13%
Poor links to international distribution chains 8%
Inefficient utilization of cargo-handling systems 8%
Source: 45 questionnaire responses. Each respondent indicated the top three problems in Brazilian ports before
Law 8630/93.
* 93% of business respondents indicated the union monopoly as one of the worst problems.
It is only after 1990 that port costs and inefficiencies noticeably damaged the
competitiveness of general cargo (i.e. non-bulk goods), or the very area of exports
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that dealt with manufactured goods with a higher value added component. Although
general cargo represents only a quarter of Brazilian exports, they stem from crucial
sectors that affect the competitiveness and development of the economy. Although
the problems were recognized and new investments were urgently needed, business
interviewees noted the risks of investing in ports under the prevailing port institu-
tional structure, because of uncertainly about the government’s commitment to
improving basic infrastructure and streamlining bureaucratic procedures and busi-
ness’ inability to independently determine its labor requirements.
III. BUSINESS AS OBSTACLE TO PORT REFORM IMPLEMENTATION
Ironically, business was not only the champion of port reform, but also one of
the main agents to create obstacles in the path of reform implementation. Its share
of the blame goes beyond the ill-advised action of AEI leaders to disband in 1993,
immediately after port reform received presidential approval, thus presenting port
workers with an opportunity to reclaim lost ground. Workers gambled on unin-
formed port-users, the ambivalent position of ship owners and the satisfaction of
private terminal owners. Union leaders correctly surmised that most port-users would
not monitor progress made on implementation; that ship owners would avoid con-
frontation on board their ships; that private terminal owners’ would lose the moti-
vation to fight for the full implementation of all aspects of the new law.7 But the
crucial point is: what gave union leaders this confidence that business consensus
would collapse and that the will to fight for implementation would dissipate?
A number of conjunctural factors militated against early implementation of
reform, including (i) changes in government priorities (Itamar Franco was less in-
terested in the liberalization agenda of the Collor government, and Cardoso was
uncomfortable with the wider implications of doing away with corporatist privi-
leges) and lack of government resources; and (ii) swings in economic growth and
business conditions (stabilization under the Real Plan on the one hand meant that
many businesses switched their focus back to the domestic market, and on the other
hand, many businesses preferred to obstruct or minimize growing competition from
relatively cheap imports). While these factors had a decisive impact on reform out-
comes, research showed that the corporatist networks in ports relied on institutional
rigidities to block reform implementation. The research project on which this ar-
ticle is based found that the corporatist institutional context within which interest
groups operated strongly influenced their strategies, attitudes and behavior, which
in turn impacted the chances for reform success. This article acknowledges the im-
portance of, but does not spotlight the conjunctural factors, instead it focuses on
how corporatist institutions shape business attitudes and collective action problems
inhibit business action.
7 The law authorised private terminals to handle third party cargoes, thus granting the main demand of
their association, ABTP.
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Corporatist Sectoralization: Corporatism refers to the formal structure of in-
terest representation imposed by the State and used to incorporate the groups emerg-
ing from the incipient industrialization and modernization process. The specific
features of the corporatist structure include singular, compulsory, hierarchical and
functionally differentiated categories organized into representative associations
granted exclusive control over group resources and a representational monopoly
vis-à-vis their interaction with the State.8 Although in theory, corporatism applies
to both business and labor, in practice it marginalized labor — the great exception
is the corporatist network that developed in ports between port labor unions and
the port administrative bureaucracy attached to the dock companies and federal
ministries. Effectively, the corporatist network in ports is a “bureaucratic ring” with
labor instead of business representatives.
In Brazil, State corporatism and interventionism encouraged businesses to pre-
sent their demands individually, by focusing on particularistic paths of influence to
State actors, despite nominal membership of corporatist-monopolistic associations.
The benefits of adhering to corporatist expectations are assimilated at all levels, and
provide the context within which policies are designed and then implemented. In
the case of ports, corporatist institutions award privileges and foster opposition to
reform in port labor; create sources of power among bureaucrats and engender
obstruction to reforms when these powers are withdrawn; and fragment business
interests and generate apathy to the consequences of reform among businesspeople.
The government is aware that port reform will stagnate unless corporatist privi-
leges are withdrawn, but it is reluctant to address the general issue of institutional
reform and unwilling to cut into the powers granted via the Consolidation of La-
bor Laws (CLT), the heart of corporatist legislation.9 Corporatism brings workers
and bureaucrats closer to their respective groups, but engenders disunity and apa-
thy in a fragmented business class.10 Thus, whereas labor and bureaucratic opposi-
tion to port reform required active obstruction, in the case of business, passive ne-
glect ensured that corporatist institutions successfully blocked reform. Business
interviewees repeatedly acknowledged that apathy was the result of years of:
• economic uncertainty and survival concerns;
• reliance on State subsidies and incentives, creating a culture of dependence
and paternalistic interaction with State institutions; and
8 See Schmitter (1971; 1974), Diniz and Boschi (1978), Diniz (1993), Boschi (1991), Cardoso (1986),
Cawson (1986), Cohen (1989), Evans (1979; 1995), O’Donnell (1977), and Tavares de Almeida (1989)
for good descriptions and analysis of corporatism in general and in Brazil.
9 Curiously, the daily-hire port union monopoly is based on privileges awarded under the CLT, although
port workers formally fall outside the CLT (this is because the CLT does not apply to avulsos/daily-hire
workers).
10 Perhaps the worst consequence of embedded corporatism is the evident apathy it generates. Thus, for
example, when the capital moved, the CNI did not find it necessary to move its headquarters to Brasília.
This only occurred in late 1996, when the new president of the confederation, Fernando Bezerra (who
is a senator, and therefore, spends most of his time in Brasilia), insisted that industrialists cannot hope
to monitor developments in the capital and influence policy without a permanent presence in Brasília.
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• inadequate consultation of the membership base and the politicized manage-
ment of the corporatist associations.
• More generally, corporatism was popular among industrialists, because it
maintained established patterns in capital-labor relations, granted access to substan-
tial resources via the “Sistema S” (apprentice and training programs), and provided
a guarantee against radical changes. Corporatist institutions provided some extra
reassurance in a country beset with social, political and economic problems. More-
over, business did not rely on corporatist associations alone, precisely because it was
aware of the weaknesses inherent in corporatist groups and methods of interest
representation. The private sector often benefited from a parallel representative struc-
ture, which operated outside the confines of corporatist legislation.
Brazilian corporatism failed to create strong business class solidarity and dis-
allowed the formation of a single peak association. The State ensured that business
people, locked into monopolistic structures, were given few opportunities to orga-
nize and co-ordinate their activities. Business seldom bothers to make collective
protests against uncompetitive business or regulatory practices. Business interviewees
did not remark on the contradiction inherent in the federal government’s withdrawal
from port operations, but right to nominate the head of the new port authority.
Instead, business uses the Port Authority Councils (CAPs) as a forum for the dis-
cussion of capital-labor issues, with the government as mediator in the corporatist
tradition.
However, business attitudes appear to be changing. The younger generation of
businesspeople often refers to corporatist federations as “irrelevant, anachronistic
and comatose” institutions. In June 1996, Ricardo Semler wrote:
“FIESP has no reason to exist any longer. Not in its classical format.
[...] All organizations of this type (i.e. agglomerating business interests) are
bureaucratized to the point of inactivity; they are cellars facilitating influ-
ence bargaining and corruption, and end up attracting petty interests and
figures of little importance.”11
Several businessmen commonly referred to their associations and federations
as “parasites” and “dinosaurs”, that they “represent diluted interests and operate
like grand money spending machines, and serve to inflate the egos and pockets of
their directors”.12 One claimed, “doctrine and philosophy are not as important as
the struggle for power within the FIESP. Unimportant businessmen often strive for
the most important positions within the federation”.
Although corporatism hampers business collective action during policy formu-
lation, it is policy implementation that highlights corporatism’s truly debilitating
11 Signed article by Ricardo Semler in Folha de S. Paulo, 21 June 1996. Semler is a past director of FIESP
and a vocal critic of business corporatism.
12 These comments are from a number of business interviewees in São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and Porto
Alegre.
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affect on business action and unity. Corporatist traditions accentuate personalistic
and particularist interaction between business and State actors. Networks emerge
along the lines of closed “bureaucratic rings” (these will be analyzed later in the
article). This usually assures some degree of access to large firms, but leaves small
and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) with few options. Thus, corporatism reinforces
sectoral and size-based divisions, which further reduce business unity and ability
to put pressure on State actors for policy implementation. An excellent illustration
of the problem: the port-user committee, COMUS, of the Commercial Association
of São Paulo (ACSP) conducted a survey in May 1994. It sent out 1000 survey forms
to small and medium-sized export businesses and received only 81 responses. 95%
of these firms said that they did not follow progress in the implementation of Law
8.630/93, a law that could directly enhance their competitiveness in international
markets and increase their profits. Similarly, there are few protests from port-users
affected by the cartel-like practices of the private sector warehousing firms in the
Santos area (warehousing firms argue their case based on the legal requirement that
they charge clients at least as much as the state-owned dock company, CODESP)
and the remarkably uniform tariffs charged by the newly qualified private sector
port operators.
Disintegrating Consensus: Decades of past governments’ divisive strategies made
business consensus rare and unlikely to last. Business learned to take a reactive-
adaptive short-term approach in its relations with State actors. While such tactics
were necessary, given the policy shifts and shocks of the past two decades and the
concentration of power in the Executive, — it also reduced business capacity to resist,
based on principle. As one AEI leader noted, “Everybody is courageous when all is
well [...] The first sign of trouble and all resistance breaks down. This makes main-
taining solidarity an unrealizable goal” (interview in October 1997 in Rio de Ja-
neiro). Corporatist federations find it difficult to focus on common positions, and
conflicts of interest among directors and conflicting interests of members are the
norm. Matters are further complicated by the fact that federations in different states
sometimes oppose each other’s positions.13 Not surprisingly, government and legis-
lators usually receive a confused picture of business policy preferences. Brazilian
business’ Achilles heel is disunity.
Divergence of interests and competition among businesses are not unusual, but
what is remarkable is that Brazilian business is unable to forge and then maintain a
consensus, because of the strong incentives to yield to the temptation of particular-
ist access to (often corrupt) bureaucrats who implement policies in a discretionary
manner. Institutional arrangements, based on corporatism, State interventionism and
a closed economy, augment business opportunities for rent-seeking and free-riding.
This became obvious already in the early period of port reform, when the media
noted the competitive behavior of port-users who made private agreements with
13 For example, FIESP opposed a bill providing special incentives for the merchant marine and ship-
builders. In Rio de Janeiro, there was strong support for the bill reflecting the importance of ship-build-
ers in the Rio federation. Interviews in São Paulo in July 1994.
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unions to speed up the handling of their own cargoes at the expense of the collec-
tive decision to insist on the implementation of the new labor management regime.14
This type of free-rider behavior discredited any attempt to demonstrate longer-term
business unity and solidarity on the port issue.
Later, two other groups of businesses demonstrated a more overt tendency to
subvert reform implementation — maritime agents and manufacturers of tradeables
in recently liberalized sectors. The former group actually benefited from high port
costs because they were paid on a percentage of these, and the latter group histori-
cally tended to ignore port issues because they were irrelevant in their highly pro-
tected “captive” markets. During the policy formulation stage, the AEI managed
to marginalize maritime agents and failed to devise any compensatory mechanism,
thus leaving this key group of port related businesses without any stake in success-
ful reform implementation. This problem was compounded, when under the new
legislation, many former maritime agents registered as port operators, thus under-
lining their lack of identification with the interests of port-users. Meanwhile, the
second group passively went along with AEI’s demands, perhaps not calculating the
competitiveness impact of more efficient and cheaper ports on the price of imports
in the domestic market. Moreover, during policy formulation, the emphasis was on
increasing exports (liberalization had not yet led to a surge in imports), something
that most businesses could agree on. However, the greater market liberalization and
price stabilization from 1994 onwards enlarged the group of businesses unwilling
to face additional competitive pressure from cheap and efficient ports.
Ultimately, AEI failed because business was disunited. Cooperation and con-
sensus were practical as well as theoretical problems. A superficial consensus, once
exposed, strengthened the hands of the opposition. It was superficial to the extent
that it was a passive agreement to go along with AEI leaders’ demands.15 What had
been a strength during policy formulation (because it limited the number of par-
ticipants in the policy arena and concentrated policy inputs), became a weakness
in the policy implementation phase of reform (because most businessmen were not
committed to AEI positions, and hence, uninterested in monitoring implementation).
The fragile consensus broke down as soon as the diverse sub-sectors realized the
differing impact of port reform on each of their businesses. Moreover, for most
businesses, cargo volumes and values were not sufficiently large to make it worth-
while to hold out for reform, and they preferred to yield to the demands of port
unions and port operators to ensure timely delivery of their goods.
Business played a central role in the implementation of the port modernization
process, because in line with government policy, the law sought to minimize gov-
ernment involvement in ports. The private sector was given control not only over
worker registration and nomination to work-teams, but was also given responsi-
bility for undertaking investment and improving efficiency in port infrastructure and
14 See Tavares de Oliveira’s articles in O Globo, 9 November 1995 and 3 October 1996.
15 One labour leader remarked on the “fictional and fabulous” nature of the business consensus, which
“once unmasked could not protect business victories.” (interview in October 1997 in Brasília).
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services via privatization of port operations. Thus, while port-users continued to
struggle with high prices and inefficiency, port operators suddenly resisted reduc-
ing prices and investing in modernization. Both operators and ship owners were
accused of cartel-like price setting.16
One important lesson for business was that the fighting spirit and the pro-re-
form network must be maintained until implementation is assured and complete.
Businesspeople soon realized that reviving their former unity of purpose and action
was a formidable task, and the reconstituted AEI, operating under the name Co-
missão Portos, was unable to achieve the same level of commitment and unity among
its members. All the same, AEI set a powerful example. In fact, business tried to
build an AEI-style unified multi-associational and cross-sectoral platform around
demands for constitutional reform. Jorge Gerdau was specifically invited to lead this
effort, in an attempt to capitalize on his reputation as leader of the original AEI.
Business also learnt that consensus and unity were invaluable assets in a lob-
bying campaign. In 1996, Fernando Bezerra, president of CNI, called upon indus-
try to present a united front to government and society:
“We feel the necessity of constructing unity in the industrial sector,
which is not an easy task. Not that we are disunited, but the fact is that
we are dispersed. Also the client-supplier relation can be conflictual. Hence,
the need to create unity [...] We have a contribution to make that goes
beyond our factories; we have a contribution to make to the economic,
political and social development of our country.”17
To summarize, in certain cases, business provided workers and bureaucrats, who
have a vested interest18 in the longevity of port service monopolies, with the am-
munition to destroy hopes for an efficient and cost-effective port system. Although
corporatism and disunity reinforce each other, there are signs of change. Firstly,
globalization, liberalization and deregulation pose new challenges for business and
promote more active participation in the policy debate.
Secondly, democratization altered the parameters of acceptable business lob-
bying and interaction with State actors. The means employed to influence outcomes
became as important as the composition of business demands. Currently, lobbying
as well as policy outputs are evaluated in terms of their normative content, and
demands must be couched in terms of the public interest to achieve legitimacy in
the eyes of society. Moreover, the State no longer possesses the authoritarian capacity
to enforce implementation, and must negotiate with interest groups so that policy
intentions match policy outcomes.
16 A 1996 FIPE study found that the private sector was to blame for a large proportion of port ineffi-
ciency and high costs. It specifically noted the uniform price table of port operators in Santos port.
17 Quoted in the O Estado de S. Paulo, 19 May 1996.
18 Anti-reform State actors include some members of the port administrations, transport and labour
ministries, customs clearance officials, state and municipal governments tied to port interests, legisla-
tors with strong port constituencies, and even some members of the Navy.
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Thirdly, whereas in the past, government ministers in effect “bought the con-
science” of federation directors by handing out subsidies and privileges, the new
environment forces the federations and businesses to look within themselves for profit
and success. Many businesses have committed substantial resources to moderniz-
ing and improving the quality of their output and the productivity of their facto-
ries. The new business elite is drawn from firms that are winners in a competitive
environment, and are unlikely to allow reactionary corporatist practices to jeopar-
dize the success of their investments. AEI’s achievements give business hope that
corporatism and disunity can be overcome, and that institutions and behavior re-
spond to changing circumstances.
IV. OVERCOMING BUSINESS DIFFICULTIES
Analysis of business difficulties in influencing and sustaining the pressure for
policy reform raises the issue of whether the rigid structures of corporatism are
compatible with liberalization and modernization. Why does corporatism inhibit
progress? What are the modifications to business-State relations suggested by AEI’s
experience? While the policy formulation period of AEI success suggests solutions
that move in opposite directions, policy implementation appears to depend on pres-
sure exerted through a long-lasting stable closed network with a stake in reform
success. Early stages of the reform process show that on the one hand, at the sectoral
level, business needs to overcome fragmentation and weak policy formulation ca-
pacity by constructing a close-knit stable policy network. On the other hand, at the
aggregate (class) level, business must overcome disunity and problems of collective
action by building a broad peak association structure that can aggregate and articu-
late interests at the national level to press home the importance of a particular
measure for the general interest of business. Later stages of the reform process rely
on the engagement of a specific group, coalition or network prepared to play an
active role in monitoring implementation with only tacit support at the aggregate
level. The following analysis demonstrates that these solutions are complementary
in character, although they might appear to be contradictory.
Liberalization and globalization obliged business to open its eyes to the long-
lasting hold of the port unions on port policy (the port labor regime dates back to
the 1930s), and exposed the weakness of business networks in the port sector. Busi-
ness understood that the politicization of the port issue was necessary to force a
complete change in the structure and institutions of the port sector, to overthrow
the established rules of the game and consultation mechanisms. It needed to muscle
its way into the comfortable relations within the corporatist network between bu-
reaucrats and labor in the sector. The competence and perseverance of the AEI lobby
bore fruit in terms of business impact on policy output. But the lack of a stable policy
community jeopardized business’ ability to match policy intentions with outcomes.
The preceding sections demonstrated first, how business organized itself and
built a network around the issue of port institutional modernization, and then, how
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corporatism impacted business attitudes and actions, fragmented business demands
and blocked reform. The success of the AEI, as a network that lies somewhere be-
tween issue network and policy community, suggests the utility of looking into the
option that policy network analysis offers for the adaptation of corporatist institu-
tions to a modernizing reform agenda. This section presents a brief description of
policy networks and contrasts them with corporatist networks in Brazil. Since this
article focuses on business networks, it will analyze the difference between policy
networks and bureaucratic rings (the specific form business corporatist networks
take), and locate the AEI within the analysis.
Although there are a few exceptions, notably Peter Evans19, the general body
of network literature does not deal with developing economies. Yet here the impor-
tance of networks, personal and institutional, cannot be overlooked. Brazil is a case
in point. In a country where economic groups are marginalized from strategic deci-
sion-making, businesspeople are forced to develop alternate, informal channels of
access to State actors, usually to the relevant bureaucratic agency, entrusted with
the application of rules and the allocation of resources, in the sector. Thus, busi-
ness associations develop into sector-specific nuclei with solidarity to particular
agencies. While options under authoritarian regimes were limited, democratization
provided business with the opportunities and appropriate channels to attract the
attention of the executive and legislature. If it managed to play its cards right, it
would benefit from the establishment of policy communities.
Jordan and Richardson developed the idea of a policy community as a closed
and close group with frequent interaction and shared values, where State actors
tended to consult certain groups, and limited access to others. The relationship was
not zero-sum, since a well-resourced State could increase its autonomy, and extend
its infrastructural power, through policy networks. The network approach also
emphasized the difficulty in drawing a stark dichotomy between State and civil
society. After all, State actors are members of society.
Table VI
Policy Network Analysis
Dimension Policy Community Issue network
Membership Limited numbers; some exclusion Large numbers
Type of Interest Economic/Professional Wide range of interests
Frequency of Interaction Frequent; high quality Contact fluctuates
Continuity Membership, values, and Fluctuating access
outcomes are persistent
Consensus Participants share basic values Some agreement; some conflict
Power Positive-sum; balance Zero-sum; unequal
Source: Smith (1993); Marsh & Rhodes (1992)
19 Evans (1995) developed the concept of “embedded autonomy” to explain the network of social ties
that binds the State to society and provides the institutional channels for policy formulation in develop-
ing countries like Brazil, India and Korea.
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Policy networks can range from a limited exchange of information to institu-
tionalization of the group within the policy process; from closed and close-knit policy
communities to open issue networks as described in Table VI.20 In a policy commu-
nity there is a high degree of consensus on policy aims, rules of the game, as well as
the range of problems and potential solutions to them. Policy communities create
stability in the policy arena, since they de-politicize the issue. In an issue network
the reverse applies — there is no consensus between groups on policy aims, a large
number of groups and government departments may be involved, increasingly po-
liticizing the issue and impeding stable and lasting solutions. Finally, policy networks
should not be confused with corporatist networks, where policy consensus is irrel-
evant because of the State’s agenda setting powers, and centralization of decision-
making means power is shared unequally (although it can be positive-sum). More-
over, interaction is ad hoc, personalistic, and often takes place in a controlled un-
democratic context.
Already, Schmitter (1971) noted the paradox of the highly formal nature of
corporate interest groups that contrasted with the intimate, interpersonal and largely
unrecorded manner of conducting business-State relations. For most of the past 60
years, business normally dealt with the government via narrow, decentralized, ad
hoc networks, or what Cardoso called “bureaucratic rings”. When in the early 1980s,
Minister Delfim Netto phased out official representation of business in government
councils, businesspeople were forced to turn to the middle-level bureaucracy, and
to create informal links with them to influence policy implementation. Thus, bu-
reaucratic spheres emerged, drawing in bureaucratic allies of business to defend the
latter’s economic interests (Cardoso, 1986). However, as Schneider notes, industri-
alists only had limited success at perforating bureaucratic insulation, and in gen-
eral, “industrialists have never modeled lasting paths of access to policy-making
circles.” (Schneider, 1991).
Bureaucratic rings should not be seen as the equivalent of policy communities.
They differ on a number of important aspects. First, bureaucratic rings were tar-
geted at the regulatory and implementation phase of policy; a policy community’s
objective is to influence policy-formulation and monitor implementation. Second,
business approached State actors in bureaucratic rings as a supplicant, in the ex-
pectation of some reward; in a policy community, the State consults business at every
stage, and business is an almost equal partner in determining the policy agenda and
policy output. Third, bureaucratic rings were ad hoc groups, based on personal
relations and interaction; a policy community is long lasting with frequent interac-
tion based on semi-institutionalized relations (i.e. a policy community does not rely
on exclusively personal connections and preferences, and exists beyond the terms
of office of individual ministers, bureaucrats and group leaders). Fourth, bureau-
cratic rings were often secretive and did not seek exposure in the media, making
20 Marsh and Rhodes note that networks can be arranged on a continuum, ranging from policy commu-
nity to issue network.
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them most successful in a non-democratic setting; a policy community operates in
a democratic context and relies on the media to communicate its views to society.
Table VII
Types of Policy Networks in Brazil
Dimension Policy Community Bureaucratic Ring
State Actor High-level bureaucrats; Ministers Middle— bureaucrats; rarely ministers
Participation
Target Policy formulation & implementation Policy regulation & implementation
Interaction Frequent; semi-institutionalized Ad hoc; personal
Continuity Membership, values, outcomes persistent Fluctuating access and outcomes
Consensus Participants share basic values Not directly relevant
Power Positive-sum; balance Positive-sum; unequal
Media Free and democratic Controlled and censored
Source: author’s own elaboration.
The key concern in a democratic setting is the State’s need to retain autonomy
and prevent its agent’s closeness from degenerating into rent-seeking coalitions, that
is, bureaucratic rings are seen as unacceptable forms of business-State interaction.
Evans (1995) found that industrial transformation thrived, where the State success-
fully combined an embedded bureaucracy with an autonomous State and where
business-State networks helped improve policy inputs and outcomes. One of the main
benefits of “embedded autonomy” was that it helped States resolve the contradic-
tion between credibility and flexibility in a reform project. It allowed bureaucrats
to make adjustments to reform packages, without losing credibility. The key was
communication with business networks that learned to understand the signals and
intentions of State actors. Reformers need societal support.
The juggling act that demonstrated firmness of intentions and flexibility of
actions required strong institutions and lines of communication between the key
participants in the political economy. In this sense, policy communities assist in
achieving a close match between policy intentions and outcomes due to their abil-
ity to maintain open lines of communication between State and society. In Brazil,
repeated economic crises forced policy-makers to change direction on a number of
occasions, but limited dialogue between business and State increased uncertainty
and complicated implementation. Moreover, fragile institutions, at both the State
and associational levels, made it difficult to organize support for reform programs.
The only strong institution, corporatism, hindered market-oriented reform, and
hampered the formation of new networks geared towards structural reform.
The established corporatist network in ports had the tenacity and capacity to
block implementation of Law 8.630/93. Union leaders, interviewed in 1994 more
than a year after adoption of the law, could proudly claim that “so far we have lost
nothing; nothing has changed”. There is no better testimony to demonstrate the
effectiveness of the port corporate network in maintaining the status quo than the
survival of the port union monopoly in nominating daily-hire labor to work teams
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aboard ships.21 It also illustrates the dimension of the problem facing the nascent
AEI, a new network forced to contend with a sixty-year old entrenched one.
AEI’s relations to State actors resembled an issue network in terms of frequency
of interaction, continuity and consensus. In terms of the other dimensions in Table
VII, i.e. membership, type of interest and power, it resembled a policy community.
Its trump card was its essentially democratic and open character. At the policy for-
mulation stage, AEI could have been described as a fledgling policy community, but
it failed to cash in on this advantage. Surprisingly, business leaders initially failed
to recognize the importance of establishing a long-term close-knit policy commu-
nity to monitor reform implementation, reducing AEI at best to an issue network,
suffering from the associated weaknesses of such networks.
Although corporatist networks and policy communities are based on very dif-
ferent principles, their essential structure of stable relations between State and non-
State actors are sufficiently similar to allow incremental adjustments to corporatist
institutions, democratizing them, to eventually establish policy communities. The
research project found that corporatist networks could serve as the building blocks
for the development of democratic policy networks via the restructuring and con-
solidation of the former into policy communities. The latter provide groups with
new opportunities to form constructive democratic alliances that collaborate with
reform efforts and offer a feasible option for the evolution of corporatism.
However, policy communities do have their limitations. Firstly, the legacy of
corporatism in Brazil: replacing corporatist institutional arrangements with their
emphasis on the top-down approach to interest representation with policy commu-
nities with their emphasis on a shared role for all participants in decision-making
is unlikely to be seamless. Secondly, impatient reformers might not be willing to wait
for the gradual development of policy communities. Moreover, policy communities
in general can have the distinct disadvantage of discouraging innovative approaches
and radical solutions to policy problems, because of their emphasis on institutional-
ized non-conflictual relations within the community (it is in this sense that most
established networks tend to be pro status quo).
It may not be possible to create efficient policy communities in the short run,
but these networks present a better medium-term opportunity for business to in-
fluence policy outcomes than do purely pluralist options. There is a certain appeal
to the logic of adaptive efficiency, where the institutional structure changes via in-
cremental adjustments to the formal rules and the informal constraints and norms
of behavior, avoiding abrupt breaks in the historical evolution of these institutions.
21 In 1998, Salvador became the first port to allow the business controlled OGMO to nominate work-
teams. In February 2001, eight years after the law came into effect, unions in most ports, including Santos,
retained the right to nominate workers.
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V. CONCLUSION
The port reform issue underlined the erosion of traditional business-State relations.
Democratization and socio-economic modernization changed the political and eco-
nomic context within which business operated, and challenged the existing patterns
of interest aggregation and representation. First, democratization increased the im-
portance of transparency in policy-making and implementation, and of augmenting
the role of labor to prevent business capture of bureaucratic agencies (on some occa-
sions, as in ports, the reverse applied). Second, democratization changed the position
of bureaucrats, as business networks or individual firms’ ties within bureaucratic rings
were diluted. Third, labor became more assertive with socio-economic modernization.
It was quick to form a number of competing labor peak associations to bring their
collective interests to bear on policy-makers and to enhance their bargaining power
with employers. Fourth, the heightened complexity of economic policy-making and
the reduced capacity of the State enhanced the role of business associations in policy
implementation. Fifth, the younger generation of business leaders accepted the need
for an open and democratic approach to policy-makers and other State actors. It is
in this modern business class that there originates the strong possibility of moving
beyond rent-seeking coalitions and individualistic forms of business-State interaction.
It is worth highlighting the benefits of applying an eclectic mix of approaches
and theories to explain business behavior. Although the port reform process is a very
specific and narrow area of study, the case is rich with suggestions for institutional
and structural reforms in other issue areas in Brazil. It demonstrated the consequences
of overlooking the influence and entrenched position of prevalent corporatist net-
works. The wide-ranging impact of port reform on the economy as a whole and
the way it involved all participants in the political process provide useful insight into
how interests can successfully approach the question of institutional reform.
To summarize, this article analyzed the impact of corporatism and the diffi-
culty of institutional change; it then used policy network analysis to suggest the
possible direction of institutional modernization. The dynamic element in the evo-
lutionary process was explained via the logic of collective action model, which in-
volves evaluating the conditions required for business to organize and co-operate
in its demands for institutional change. AEI closely reflects the theoretical explana-
tions for the evolution of Brazilian institutions and interest groups. It constructed
unity from corporatist fragmentation, after an active group of winners managed to
organize collective action along the lines of policy networks.
Although AEI managed to put in place a successful issue network, it failed to
establish a policy community to replace the old-style corporatist network in ports.
This failure touches on a very important question in the academic debate around
institutional change: what accounts for the survival of institutions that consistently
under-perform over long periods of time? The paper provided some insight into the
nature of vested interests, and how reformers find it extremely difficult to shift the
former’s focus from redistributive to productive activities. Another obstacle is State
capacity, which this article does not elaborate on.
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The slow and costly reform process, weighed down by the legacy of corporat-
ist inertia as described in this article, is perhaps the least efficient approach to re-
form, but Brazil is yet to demonstrate political commitment and economic backing
for a radical, clean-cut break away from past institutional structures and procedures.
The question of constructing a lasting pro-reform consensus reappears at numer-
ous junctures, but so far institutions and the political bargaining process have been
unable to prevent the consensus from disintegrating. While some attempts were made
at establishing policy networks to steer the reform process, these fell short of en-
trenching themselves, were unable to rationalize institutional modernization, and
thus failed to maximize the social and economic benefits of the reform process.
To conclude, the port reform process might be an extreme and stark example
of business lobbying and the legacy of corporatism, but it served as an excellent means
for laying bare the tendencies exhibited by and hindering the Brazilian institutional
and structural reform process. The main value of the analysis lies in the fact that
port reform can be linked to the broader reform agenda in Brazil and Latin America.
The port reform process exposed all the weaknesses of Brazilian business, but also
demonstrated that business could overcome these weaknesses. The key lessons were
that strength and influence were the fruits of unity and consensus among business
people, and corporatist institutions could evolve into policy networks based on
pluralist and democratic approaches to business-State relations. AEI showed busi-
ness that its Achilles heel could be overcome, and perhaps cured.
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